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This paper studies discrimination against immigrants in the consumer market in 
Spain. We send emails of fictitious buyers to a popular Spanish second hand market 
webpage similar to ebay. Sellers are approached randomly by buyers with Spanish 
native or foreign sounding names to signal their ethnic origin. We find that those 
buyers with a foreign sounding name are contacted around 7.8 percentage points 
less than those with a Spanish sounding name. We then turn to explore how the 
price of the advertised good influences the degree of discrimination against foreign 
sounding names. We find that differential treatment across names occurs with more 
intensity for cheaper goods. 
Keywords: discrimination, second hand consumer market, field experiment. 
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Spain is one of the main “doors” for immigration entry into Europe, with a 
massive inflow of immigration, specially coming from South America and North 
Africa. During the last decade, the share of immigrant population in Spain has grown 
from 2.28% in 2000, to 12.08% in 2009 (data from INE, 2010). If this growth rate 
continues, in 2020 the immigrant population in Spain could represent more than 20% of 
the total population (INE, 2010).  
 
This paper analyzes to what extent this new immigrant population faces 
discriminatory behaviour in consumer markets using a correspondence experimental 
design. We are not the first ones to analyze discrimination against minorities using an 
experimental design. A growing number of studies have focused in detecting 
discrimination in a variety of settings: US labour market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2004); US housing market (Carpusor and Loges, 2006;  Riach and Rich, 2002); Swedish 
rental market (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008); and US consumer markets (Yinger, 
1998). In a similar setting to ours, Bosch et al. (2010) find a significant degree of 
differential treatment between Moroccan immigrants and Spanish natives in the Spanish 
rental market. On average, an individual with Moroccan sounding name is around 15 
percentage points less likely to receive a reply than an individual with a Spanish 
sounding name.  
 
Traces of discrimination are systematically found in this literature in various 
settings, such as labour market or the housing rental market. They all have common 
features: They usually involve transactions that require a continuous interaction between 
the two agents. Such is the case of renting a flat or obtaining a job. For similar reasons, 
the stakes of the transactions are high, normally involving large amounts of money. This 
implies that small differences in priors on the ability to perform a particular transaction 
may give rise to large gaps in differential treatment between natives and non-natives. 
   
Instead, we focus on a setting where the interaction between the two agents is 
minimal, since the online second hand market does not require continuous interaction 
between the buyer and the seller. Furthermore, the possibility of default is also 
negligible, since the postal services will not deliver the goods unless payment has been 
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 satisfied. Finally, we can explore how the amount of the transaction influences the 
degree of differential treatment. Hence, we argue that in our setting the differential 
treatment that we find is purged of many of the confounding factors that are present in 
other studies. Further, as Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2008) argue, “discrimination in 
restaurants or shopping is as important as discrimination in employment or housing. The 
latter two activities are more crucial to a person’s life chances, but it also seems clear 
that discrimination in everyday transactions imposes significant psychological costs on 
its victims and is a clear violation of civil rights laws”. There is thus ample justification 
both for wanting to know more about it. 
 
We highlight three main results in our paper. First, we find that the differential 
treatment between buyers with a native sounding name and buyers with a foreign 
sounding name is around 7.8 percentage points. Although this is not entirely 
comparable to previous results, because they analyze different markets, we point out 
that the percentage of discrimination is substantially lower than the ones of Bosch et al. 
(2010) and Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) obtained for the Spanish rental market. 
This suggests that, as expected, lower interactions between agents and lower stakes that 
characterize the second hand market reduces the differential treatment between natives 
and ethnic minorities. 
 
Second, we distinguish between three different foreign nationalities in our study. 
We include British sounding names, Moroccan sounding names, and Latin American 
sounding names. By nationality, our point estimate of discrimination is slightly lower 
for British sounding names (6.3 percentage points) compared to Moroccan (8.5 
percentage points) or Latin American (8.7 percentage points) sounding names. This 
suggests that the differential treatment found in this study cannot be fully ascribed to 
priors on the income differences across nationalities.  
  
Finally, we allow our estimates on the differential treatment between natives and 
foreign sounding names to vary across the amount of the transactions. In our sample we 
have a significant range of prices, from 1 Euro of a toy of to 50,000 Euros of a sports 
car. We do not find significant evidence that price alters the degree of discrimination in 
our experiment. If anything, higher prices reduce the amount of discrimination.  
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 In our view, this new evidence of the Spanish second hand market signals that 
the traces of discrimination are present even for very cheap goods in situations were the 
possibility of default is low. The fact that British sounding names are also discriminated 
against Spanish sounding names and the lack of a systematic relationship between price 
and differential treatment suggest that statistical theories of discrimination are not 
responsible for the patterns found here.  
Our interpretation of the results is that the differential treatment observed in this 
experiment is due, to some extent, to the preference of the seller to limit interaction with 
foreign buyers. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 explains in detail our experimental design. Section 4 presents the main results 
of the paper. And section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Evidence of discrimination in consumer markets 
 
Economists have historically had a great deal to say about the causes and 
consequences of racial discrimination in employment. However, the impact of 
discrimination on other economic interactions as consumer markets remains relatively 
unstudied. Anecdotal evidence would suggest, however, that discriminatory treatment in 
everyday market transactions is a fact of life for many US consumers who find 
themselves being unable to obtain (or paying higher prices for) the goods and services 
they wish to purchase (Antecol and Cobb-Clark, 2008). 
 
Yinger (1998) reviews a number of studies related to discrimination in consumer 
markets. Two main techniques to search for the existence of discrimination in various 
consumption markets have been used: regression analysis and audits. The regression 
methodology employs some consumption outcome, typically a price, as the dependent 
variable, and group membership indicators, along with relevant controls, as the 
explanatory variables. The test for discrimination is whether the coefficient for the 
relevant group membership variable is significant. The regression methodology, 
originally developed for labor markets, also has been applied to housing (Chambers, 
1992; Wachter and Megbolugbe, 1992; Keil and Zabel, 1996) and car sales (Goldberg, 
1996). As shown by Yinger (1998), the regression approach is subject to several 
potential biases; moreover it is indirect, as it attempts to isolate the impacts of 
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 discrimination on prices without directly observing discriminatory behavior. In contrast, 
an audit can literally catch economic agents in the act of discriminating. It minimizes 
the differences in treatment caused by variables that can go unobserved by studies 
employing regression. Audit studies do not need to make assumptions about the form of 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. By an audit, one can 
match similar individuals, assign them characteristics that do not differ more than in 
race, ethnicity, or sex, that is relevant to their treatment in the market place. 
 
At the same time, audit studies have a number of disadvantages. First, like other 
experimental methods, audit studies are often limited in their external validity. 
Consequently, an audit study does not provide evidence on discrimination in general, 
but rather informs us about discrimination within the specific context defined by the 
study’s sampling frame. Because of this, audit studies are limited in distinguishing the 
broader circumstances—in particular the market conditions—in which discrimination in 
commercial transactions might occur (Yinger, 1998). Second, inferences from audit 
studies can be quite sensitive to alternative assumptions about the distribution of 
unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman, 1998). Finally, audit studies are not particularly 
useful in situations where the risk of discrimination per transaction is low, for example 
in shops or restaurants, or in measuring the effects of disparate impact discrimination 
(Siegleman, 1998). 
 
The technique of conducting carefully controlled field experiments to measure 
discrimination in the market place is 35 years old (Riach and Rich, 2002). One usual 
way for audits is that in which people from two different groups are selected, trained, 
and assigned to two-group pairs such that teammates are equally qualified to buy a 
house or a car, etc. A sample of the agents whose behavior is being studied, landlords or 
car dealers, for example, is then drawn. Audit teammates successively visit each agent 
to inquire about an advertised housing unit or a type of vehicle. After the visit, each 
teammate independently records how he or she was treated. The problem with this 
process is that discriminatory treatment can bother auditors and so compromise their 
ability to fill out audit survey forms accurately.  
 
Using emails for the audit can eliminate this problem. Bosch et al. (2010) find 
signals of discriminatory behavior in the housing rental market in Spain. Concretely, 
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 they investigate discrimination against Moroccan immigrants by conducting an 
experiment consisting on emails. Fictitious applicants send email showing their interest 
in vacant rental apartments, and signing with names of Moroccan or Spanish origins. 
Moreover, the emails show different amounts of information on their ability to pay the 
rent (information related to socioeconomic status), in order to analyze if this 
information has any effect on the type of response. They find that applicants with a 
Moroccan name are 15 percentage points less likely to receive a response than those 
with a Spanish name. On the other hand, revealing positive information about the 
socioeconomic status of the Moroccan applicant increases the probability of being 
contacted by 9 percentage points, although this information does not completely 
eliminate discriminatory behavior. 
 
Many studies have explored the magnitude and statistical significance of 
discrimination in housing in The United States. Most of them demonstrate that black 
and Hispanic home seekers encounter discrimination in many aspects of a housing 
transaction. They are told about fewer available units and must put forth considerably 
more effort to obtain information and to complete a transaction. These barriers are not 
absolute, but they impose significant costs on black and Hispanic home seekers relative 
to comparable whites in the form of higher search costs, poorer housing outcomes, or 
both (Yinger, 1998).  
 
A few others studies have examined discrimination in car sales markets. All 
these studies yield similar results: audit studies show that women and blacks often face 
higher prices for new cars than do corresponding white men. Moreover, the differences 
were quite large (Yinger, 1998). 
 
Yinger’s study is referred in a report of The Urban Institute (1998), together 
with some other studies on discrimination on housing, employment, business, and 
“everyday” commercial transactions, as car buying, TV repair, hailing a taxi, or being 
served in a restaurant. Siegleman (1998) refers a test about public accommodations, in 
which 45% of blacks believed they had been discriminated against at least once in the 
past 30 days: 30% while shopping, 21% while dining out. 
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 Field experiments suggest that women face longer wait times in coffee shops 
(Myers et al., 2010), and that minority buying agents receive worse initial offers for 
sports memorabilia (List, 2004), while fast-food prices have been shown to rise with the 
size of the black population in the corresponding neighborhood (Graddy, 1997). 
 
Riach and Rich (2002) emphasize the significance of carefully-controlled field 
experiments as a research technique for economists to analyze economic discrimination. 
In a survey about field experiments of discrimination in the market place, they make 
reference to significant levels of discrimination against nonwhites and women in labor, 
housing and product markets in other countries. Rates of employment discrimination 
against non-whites, in excess of 25% have been measured in Australia, Europe and 
North America. A small number of experiments have also investigated employment 
discrimination against the disabled in Britain and the Netherlands, and against older 
applicants in the United States. 
 
Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2008) analyze the relationship between the characteristics of 
local markets and the propensity for consumers to report racial and ethnic 
discrimination in their everyday commercial transactions. They carry out the study by 
using the Armed Forces Equal Opportunity Survey, that asks directly about off-base 
discrimination in patronizing local businesses, as well as in acquiring non-governmental 
housing. Beyond the analysis of the housing market, they also consider discrimination 
in other kinds of routine commercial transactions like shopping, eating in restaurants, 
banking, etc. On the other hand, they analyze the extent to which consumer market 
discrimination is related to the ethnic and racial composition, economic vulnerability, 
housing market, and social context in the local community. They find one in eight 
soldiers reporting that they or their families have experienced racial discrimination in 
finding non-government housing or in patronizing businesses in their local 
communities. 
 
3. Experimental design 
 
This experiment is based on an email correspondence testing method. We send 
written applications to second hand items sale ads on the Internet. Information about 
second hand items for sale is obtained from one of the most popular buy and sale sites 
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 in Spain, Segundamano.es. These items are classified by provinces, and then by 
categories and subcategories. We focus our study in six provinces (Madrid, Barcelona, 
Valencia, Alicante, Castellón and Murcia), and four main categories: (1) House and 
garden: Housing, garden and agriculture, housing objects for children, fashion, 
jewellery, beauty and health articles. (2) Electronics: Computers and games, audio, 
video, photography, phone and others. (3) Hobbies and sports: Sports, pets and 
accessories, music, films, books, hobbies. (4) Motor vehicles: cars and accessories, 
motorcycles and accessories, quads, caravans and trailers, ships and nautical, industrial 
and agriculture vehicles.  
 
On Segundamano.com owners can advertise their products at no cost. Similarly, 
individuals interested in a particular item can email the owner free of charge. The only 
information required is the name, email address and a short message. 
 
The normal transaction would consist on an exchange of a couple of emails agreeing 
on the terms of the transaction followed by the sending of the item via postal service 
payable upon receipt in a post office. For larger and more expensive items such as cars, 
the buyer and seller would probably meet to inspect the product and arrange the terms 
of the transaction.  
 
Our experimental design is aimed at answering three main questions: (a) Are 
inquiries sent by immigrants treated differently than those of natives? (b) Are 
applications sent by immigrants treated differently depending on their origin 
(British/Moroccan/Latin American)? (c) Does the differential treatment across there 
differential treatment depending on the price of the item? 
 
In order to answer these questions, we sent emails to 2242 private sellers 
expressing interest on the advertised article. In our mails we ask for further information 
about the particular product and provide a contact and email to the seller (the first mail 
is sent via the web Segundamano.es, so the buyer does not know the seller email 
address). The experiment was conducted for four months between December 2009 and 
March 2010. During this period, our candidates applied to all ads on Segundamano.es 
for the provinces and categories indicated. 
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 For each contact we recorded the following information: date of the sent mail, 
the geographical location of the product, the heading of the ad, the category and 
subcategory of the type of product (according to Segundamano.com) and the price. All 
ads were tracked during the experiment to avoid being contacted more than once. 
During the span of the experiment we recorded whether or not the seller replied back to 
the buyer, the date of the answer (if so), the text of the answer, and the kind of answer 
(positive or negative, that is, whether or not the seller was determined to send more 
details about the article, or to proceed with the transaction). Deals were after politely 
declined by the buyers. Hence our measure of differential treatment across origins will 
be the difference between rate for natives and that of foreign buyers. 
 
In order to signal the origin of the applicant we use a common approach. In each 
email we sing with either Spanish or a foreign-sounding name. We alternate male and 
female names to check whether differential treatment varies with gender as others have 
found in different settings (see Bosch et al., 2010, and Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008). 
 
Because we want to compare the differential treatment across different foreign 
origins, we choose names to proxy a variety of ethnic origins. We employ British, 
Moroccan and Latin American sounding surnames. These constitute three of the four 
most common immigrant origins in Spain (the fourth being Eastern Europeans). Further 
they allow us to compare our results with others that have been previously found in the 
literature (see Bosch et al., 2010). In order to choose the names we use name frequency 
data collected by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) for Spanish, British, and 
Moroccan and Latin American people registered in Spain. For all these origins we 
randomly assign names to surnames within the 10 most common registered (see table 
A.1 for sample of names created). Then we create an email address for each of these 
fictitious applicants. The email accounts were created from three different free 
providers: Gmail, Hotmail and Yahoo. 
 
Several facts merit attention in this strategy. First, for Spanish, Moroccan and 






I am interested in buying this article. I would be very grateful if you contacted 
me. Thank you.  
NAME” 
 
Although Latin American names and surnames are relatively similar to Spanish 
ones, they do not overlap and can be somehow relatively easy to identify. In any case, 
for Latin American applicants we send the same text, but using language constructions 
more typical of the Spanish spoken in Latin American countries and easily identifiable 




Table A.2 presents the tabulations of our experiment. We show the response 
rates in our experiment for the different origin, male and females. Further, we divide our 
sample in four price quartiles to study discrimination patterns for different price ranges. 
 
On average, the response rates are relatively high and very similar to those 
recorded in similar experiments, between 60 and 80%. Several results can be noted from 
table A.2. First, from this tabulation, it is already clear that native sounding names 
receive on average higher response rates. Spanish sounding names get an email back 
72% of the times, while non-Spanish sounding names get a reply only 64% of the times. 
Second, we observe certain variation across nationality. Latin American and Moroccan 
sounding names show slightly lower response rates 63% than its Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts, 66%. Finally, it seems that there is not a clear discrimination pattern 
across different price ranges. 
 
In order to present the results of our experiment more systematically we run a 
series of regressions. We estimate a model where the dependent variable,  , is an 
indicator that takes value 1 if buyer i has received a reply from the seller, and 0 
otherwise. Our main explanatory variable is an indicator , that takes value 1 if the 
buyer has signalled a foreign sounding name, and 0 otherwise. In order to estimate the 




 its interaction with  . We also include a set of dummy variables to capture the fixed 
effects of the category,  , and province,  .  
i I
c D p D
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Tables A.3(a) and A.3(b) present the main results of our experiment. Column (1) 
shows our estimate of discrimination against non-Spanish. On average, emails signed 
with foreign sounding names are responded 7.8 percentage points less than those signed 
with typical Spanish names. Interestingly, our estimate is substantially lower than the 15 
to 20 percentage points typically found in other studies using the rental market as a 
setting using the same experimental design. This suggests that in an environment with 
less interaction and a low probability of default natives tend to discriminate less.  
 
In column (2) we introduce the logarithm of the price of the good and its 
interaction with the origin indicator. We do not observe any significant relationship 
between the price of the good and the level of discrimination. If anything, the point 
estimate of the interaction tends to suggest that differential treatment tends to be lower 
in transaction with higher prices. Note that there is a slightly drop in the number of 
observations from 2242 to 2148. This is due to the fact that price is missing for those 
observations 
 
Column (3) further studies the relationship between price and discrimination. 
We divide the 2148 observations in four price quartiles, 1-60, 60-175, 175-800 and 
more than 800 Euros. Instead of the price variable we use a dummy variable for each 
quartile and the interaction with the origin dummy. Table A.3(b) shows the tests for the 
significance of discrimination by price quartiles. Interesting insights emerge here. 
Discrimination against foreign sounding names in the lower quartile is 10.55 percentage 
points, very similar to that of the second quartile. In both cases the estimates are 
significantly difference from 0. For those goods between 175 and 800 Euros the 
discrimination is slightly lower, 7 percentage points, although it is not significantly 




 Columns (4) to (10) of tables A.3(a) and A.3(b) present the same analysis for 
men and women separately. A couple of facts merit attention: our point estimate 
indicates that men tend to be slightly more discriminated than women, 9 percentage 
points vs 6 percentage points. This is consistent with other studies which have found 
that in this type of experiments men tend to be faced more discrimination than women 
(Bosch et al., 2010; Ahmed and Hammarstedt; 2008). The difference between men and 
women is particularly significant for the lower quartiles of the price distribution. In 
particular, for the lowest quartile, the foreign sounding male names receive 17 
percentage points less responses, vs 5 percentage points of women, compared to their 
respective native counterparts. Interestingly, men are substantially more discriminated 
in cheaper products than in more expensive products, whereas we do not find any 
significant patterns for women.  
 
    Two alternative margins of discrimination can be explored in this experiment. 
First, for the same number of contacts, immigrants may receive more negative replies 
than natives. Second, immigrants may act as a “costumer” of last resort and only 
contacted if native consumers do not respond. We run a regression with and indicator 
variable for positive/negative replies only for those emails that were responded.   
Further, we create a variable that indicates the number of days elapsed between the 
sending of the email and the reply. We do not find any trances of such margins (results 
available upon request). 
  
Tables A.4(a) and A.4(b) replicate the results of tables A.3(a) and A.3(b) by 
nationalities. British, Latin American sounding and Moroccan sounding names all 
compared to their Spanish counterparts. Two facts are relevant from these tables. First, 
in correspondence to table A.2, discrimination seems to be slightly lower for Anglo-
Saxon sounding names, 6 percentage points than for Latin American and Moroccan 
names, 8.5 percentage points. Second, regardless of the nationality we find the same 
price patterns suggesting more discrimination in cheaper goods. 
 
Tables A.5(a) and A.5(b) analyze discrimination between Spanish and non 
Spanish by item category. The category “Electronics” presents the highest 
discrimination against immigrants: people with non Spanish sounding names receive an 
answer in a 14% less than people with Spanish names. This difference is 9 points in 
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 “Vehicles”, and nearly 8 in “Hobbies and sports”. In “House and garden” the difference 
seems not to be significantly different from 0, however. However, table A.5(b) reveals 
that there are substantial differences across categories. While in “Vehicles” and 
“Electronics” discrimination appears more intensively on cheaper goods, in “House and 
Garden” there is positive discrimination in favour of immigrants for more expensive 
goods. This is entirely due to the behaviour of towards British immigrants. 
 
Tables A.6(a) and A.6(b) show our results at the regional level
1. Results for 
Madrid, Barcelona and Murcia are relatively similar with discrimination levels ranging 
between 8 and 14 percentage points. However, in the Comunitat Valenciana we do not 
find any traces of discrimination. There is not a clear explanation for this phenomenon. 
However, if discrimination is somehow related to the share of immigrants in a particular 
region, different composition in the immigration patters in the Comunitat Valenciana 
could be a possible explanation for these results (see table A.6(c)) 
  
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our experiment has unveiled three main facts in the Spanish second hand 
consumer market. First, there are clear trances of discrimination against foreign 
sounding names. Second, discrimination seems to be more acute at lower prices. Third, 
that differential treatment is slightly higher for Latin American and Moroccan 
immigrants, but not substantially more than for British names.  
 
How do these results resonate in the discrimination literature?  One common 
thread in this literature is how much of the discrimination is due to pure dislike of the 
ethnicity/nationality (taste-based discrimination) and how much is due to the fact that 
agents use the ethnicity/nationality to infer other characteristics that are important for 
the transaction (statistical discrimination)
2. Although the results of our experiment do 
not provide a definite answer for this, they do provide some insights about the sources 
of discrimination.  
 
                                                 
1 Percentages of immigrant population by region are shown in table A.6(c). 
2 See Aigner and Cain (1977) 
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 One of main results of this experiment is that foreign sounding names are 
discriminated even in the most basic economic transactions.  Even in products below 60 
Euros, where there is very little possibility of default and the interaction between the 
buyer and the seller is minimal, we still find very significant traces of differential 
treatment against foreign sounding names. Further, although British sounding names 
report slightly higher response rates than either Moroccan or Latin American sounding 
names, they still face substantial differential treatment. It is difficult to argue that British 
sounding names will be discriminated, because the soundness of the name signals either 
the inability to pay, or a bad characteristic that inhibits the person to perform the 
transaction.  Our reading of the results is that the differential treatment observed in this 
experiment is due to some extend to taste or dislike of the seller to minimally interact 
with foreign buyers.   
 
In a comparable experiment, Bosch et al. (2010) show that in the Spanish Rental 
Market Moroccan sounding names are contacted 15 percentage points less than Spanish 
names in the rental market. Once positive information about the candidate is provided, 
discrimination falls to 10 percentage points. In our setting, where the economic 
characteristics of the buyers should not matter too much (at least for cheap transactions), 
we find for Moroccan a differential treatment of 8.5 percentage points. Again, this 
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